The most likely outcome then is a package of carefully choreographed but limited agreements: an extension of the trade truce, modest easing of export-control tensions, resumed rare-earth shipments, and highly publicized Chinese purchases of U.S. goods. There may also be new bilateral working groups on trade or AI governance, along with familiar rhetoric about “responsible competition.” Even minor adjustments in Taiwan-related phrasing or “One China” language could be presented by both sides as evidence of stabilization despite little substantive underlying policy change. What is far less likely is meaningful progress on the structural issues driving the relationship: China’s industrial subsidies, manufacturing overcapacity, and the broader imbalance between production and consumption in the Chinese economy.
That deeper imbalance is what the summit should address, even if it probably will not. The trade conflict is not fundamentally bilateral—it is macroeconomic. China’s persistent external surpluses reflect structurally weak household consumption and exceptionally high industrial capacity. Tariffs may redirect those surpluses geographically, but they do not eliminate them. A more serious bilateral framework would link stable U.S. market access and technology restrictions to gradual Chinese consumption-side reforms—such as social welfare expansion, household transfers, and services liberalization—while giving Beijing greater predictability in trade and investment policy. Neither side currently appears politically prepared for that conversation.
Iran remains the major wildcard. Washington wants Beijing to use its economic leverage over Tehran to help contain escalation and stabilize energy markets. China, meanwhile, has its own reasons to avoid prolonged disruption in the Gulf: dependence on imported energy, shipping exposure, and broader concerns about global economic instability. Their interests are more aligned on de-escalation than either side publicly admits. Quiet understandings around sanctions enforcement, energy flows, or diplomatic messaging are therefore plausible even if no formal announcement emerges from the summit.
The visit will almost certainly be presented as a success by both leaders. Trump will emphasize deals, market access, and restored diplomacy. Xi will emphasize stability, respect, and China’s centrality in global affairs. Both narratives will contain some truth, because the two leaders are answering different questions. For Trump, the summit is about demonstrating momentum. For Xi, it is about managing competition without conceding strategic ground.
The summit may stabilize atmospherics for a time. Whether it stabilizes the relationship itself is a much harder question.
This work represents the views and opinions solely of the author. The Council on Foreign Relations is an independent, nonpartisan membership organization, think tank, and publisher, and takes no institutional positions on matters of policy.